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Abstract   Polysemy is a semantic phenomenon which occurs when one lexical 
item has more meanings which can be seen as related to each other. It is to 
be distinguished from the other extreme pole of ambiguity, homonymy, which 
occurs when two or more unrelated meanings are by means of an etymologi-
cal accident tied to the same orthographic and/or phonological form. Even 
though polysemy can be considered as a non-issue, since discourse easily 
solves all of the problems of possible ambiguity for use in everyday language 
use, accounting for it (in an systematic manner) in terms of how polysemy is 
represented in the mental lexicon and how to account for the criteria govern-
ing the meaning distinctions and the interaction of meanings, for example, 
is a challenge still not fully met. The paper first gives an overview of the exist-
ing theoretical accounts of polysemy which arose over the course of the last 
two centuries to meet one of the said challenges, namely how polysemy is 
represented in our minds. The discussion is followed up by a conclusion of the 
predominant and most plausible theoretical view on multiple meanings stem-
ming from the presented philosophical, semantic, and cognitive frameworks 
and models.
Keywords: polysemy, ambiguity, cognition, language philosophy, semantics, 
prototypically, cognitive semantics, neostructuralism, generative semantics, 
lexical pragmatics 
1. Introduction
Polysemy is perhaps the most elusive semantic issue to account for and 
the following discussion seeks to outline, define it, and to place it within 
the acceptable theoretical framework of meaning. The task is made espe-
cially difficult by the fact that suggestions of how to deal with its unpre-
dictable linguistic behavior vary from one theory to the other and even 
from one individual author to the next and have not yet come to a conclu-
sion all agree upon. The first insight into the nature of polysemy, as is the 
case with most semantic issues, can be traced back to in Ancient Greece:
[…] all these terms we have selected are elements in the definable form; 
and nothing lacking, since any omission would have to be a genus or 
a differentia. […] We must start by observing a set of similar-i.e. spe-
cifically identical-individuals, and consider what element they have in 
common. We must then apply the same process to another set of in-
dividuals which belong to one species and are generically but not spe-
cifically identical with the former set. When we have established what 
UDK: 81-11  FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO XXV (4), 2014.
DOI: 10.2298/FID1404146D
Original scientific paper
147
  STUDIES AND ARTICLES
the common element is in all members of this second species, and 
likewise in members of further species, we should again consider 
whether the results established possess any identity, and persevere 
until we reach a single formula, since this will be the definition of the 
thing. But if we reach not one formula but two or more, evidently the 
definiendum cannot be one thing but must be more than one. Besides, 
every definition is always universal and commensurate: the physician 
does not prescribe what is healthy for a single eye, but for all eyes or 
for a determinate species of eye. It is also easier by this method to 
define the single species than the universal, and that is why our pro-
cedure should be from the several species to the universal genera-this 
for the further reason too that equivocation is less readily detected in 
genera than in infimae species. […] 
Aristotle (Posterior Analytics, II.13, XXX) 
Aristotle notes here that words can have more meanings and that such 
meanings have certain rules of denotation and reference, as well as a 
system of their appropriate distinction and description. Though this 
declaration can be considered as stating the obvious, the fact is, as is the 
case with most things we take for granted (such as breathing or standing 
upright), that accounting for multiplicity of meaning is not simple in 
either a theoretical or practical way. 
This problem of multiple meanings was further pursued by other philoso-
phers over the centuries and one of the most telling discussions can be 
seen in John Locke’s Defining Knowledge (1975 [1689]) where he discusses 
the linking word but (Falkum 2011:11). The same word, or rather the critique 
of Locke’s analysis of it, appeared in Gottfried Leibniz’s New Essays on 
Human Understanding (1996 [1765]). Locke claimed that the lexeme but 
can be associated with different meanings and asserted that some of them 
seem wildly unrelated (consider the differences between e.g. ‘on the con-
trary’, ‘except, save’, and ‘unless’, to name only a few). Leibniz directly dis-
agreed with Locke’s assertions and taking a completely opposite stand 
argued that instead we should try boil down all of the uses of a lexeme (in 
this case but) to “a determinate number of significations” (Leibniz 1996 
[1765]: III) and then offer up an all-encompassing paraphrase which would 
cover its entire semantic paradigm. Both of the standpoints expressed by 
the two philosophers are very significant as they worded what is, in the 
more contemporary discussion of polysemy1, a major issue to date: the 
question should polysemy be seen as only a case of one very abstract and 
general meaning which is instantiated through specific communicative 
situations as various more specific but closely related extensions (Geeraerts 
1  Though multiplicity of meaning was yet not termed so, the actual term polysemy 
being coined by Bréal (1897) at the turn of the century.
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1993). The discussion basically revolves around the issue of opposing views 
on organization of meaning. On the one hand there is the sense enu-
meration lexicon model of polysemy, which presupposes that a polysemous 
lexeme consists of different listed and stored meanings (the way words are 
usually presented in dictionaries). On the other hand we have the structure 
of the core meaning model which sees polysemous lexemes as being de-
fined and driven by a one maximally general meaning which is constant 
and present in all of it extensions (illustrated here in Figure 1 below).
Figure 1. A rough example of the two different representations of polysemy – sense 
enumeration lexicon (on the left) and the core meaning representation (on the right). 
This original problem of the representational structure of polysemy carried 
over to more linguistic (semantic and cognitive) considerations – namely 
whether word meanings should be observed as all either stored and listed 
in the form of a mental dictionary, as proposed by the sense enumeration 
idea, or as contextually derived from one very general sense, as seen by 
the core meaning approaches. Different linguistic frameworks proposed 
their collective observations on this problem and each view has had con-
sequences not only on our understanding of polysemy but on our under-
standing of what lexical meaning is as well.
2. Structuralist representation of polysemy
The general view of the structuralist paradigm is that a complex structure 
of formal and definable semantic representations must be invoked in 
order to capture the complexities of the relations between the senses 
 
look (n) 
act of directing one's gaze 
to see someone/smth.  
an expression of a feeling 
or thought by looking 
a style or fashion  
dirty look/black look - an 
angry face or a frown 
if looks could kill - to look 
at someone in an angry way 
a person's facial appearance 
considered aesthetically 
an expression of a feeling 
or thought by looking 
a style or fashion  
dirty look/black look - an 
angry face or a frown 
if looks could kill - to look 
at someone in an angry way 
a person's facial appearance 
considered aesthetically 
act of directing one's 
gaze  
 
to see someone/smth.  
look (n) 
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within a polysemous lexical item, as structuralism feels is necessary for 
meanings in general. The basis of the entire approach to structurally de-
fining meanings basically stems in its original form from the definitional 
practice (originally outlined by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics) which 
revolves around a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a lexical 
item to be seen as denoting an object in the ‘real world’ – for example a 
set of semantic primitives such as FOR SITTING, SEVERAL LEGS, BACK 
REST being conditions representing the denotate chair. This sort of an 
intuitive approach can be interpreted further in light of polysemy in two 
ways and we can start by first adopting the core meaning of one single 
general and abstract meaning from which all other meanings are seen as 
contextually derived (Ruhl 1989). One major problem that arises im-
mediately is that is practically impossible to provide minimally sufficient 
definitions which can cover all of the remote senses of certain (very poly-
semous) lexemes. Consider the following examples:
[Example 1] Marina’s look was scrutinizing him.
[Example 2] Marina’s look was very fashionable.
[Example 3] Marina’s looks were admired by everyone.
[Example 4] Marina had a look of utter amazement.
[Example 5] Marina gave him an angry look.
It would be quite difficult to come up with a minimally specific definition 
which would encompass the senses of ‘directing an appraising gaze’ in 
[Example 1], ‘fashion or style’ in [Example 2], ‘physical appearance’ in 
[Example 3], and ‘expressing a feeling or thought’ in [Example 5], for 
example. That is why the more common interpretation within all formal-
ist decompositional approaches was to see polysemy through the sense 
enumeration lexicon model (imagining each meaning of a polysemous 
word as separately stored and associated with its own set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions). 
The first application of such an enumerative perspective of meaning 
coupled with a strong formalist modeling of polysemy can be traced to 
generativist semantics and to Katz and Fodor (1963) and Katz (1972). 
They introduced two crucial semantic regulatory features in the early 
generativist account of lexical meaning – markers and distinguishers – 
functioning under the direction of projection rules. The given features 
were meant to represent the speaker’s ability to decode sentential mean-
ings on the basis of individual lexical meanings. Markers represent the 
semantic part of meaning (bow (noun) includes as a feature +PHYSICAL 
OBJECT as opposed to bow (verb) including –PHYSICAL OBJECT), and, 
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when applied to lexical ambiguity, are used to differentiate between hom-
onymy and polysemy on the basis of semantic similarity expressed by the 
markers the given meanings have in common (Geeraerts 2010:102–103). 
However, the model did not function well because the markers cannot 
be seen as distinctive enough – for example, if we consider bow again and 
the two noun homographs it can be represented as: bow meaning ‘flexible 
strip of wood, bent by a string, for shooting arrows’ and meaning ‘the 
forward end of a vessel or airship’, we can see that both can share quite a 
number of markers such as for example +PHYSICAL OBJECT, +MADE 
OF WOOD, +BENT, +FLEXIBLE etc. Nonetheless Katz and Fodor’s (1963) 
model incited a lot of debate and opened the door for further formalist 
research, as well as, ultimately, for the emergence of a more cognitive and 
yet still very much formalist view of meaning. The first descendant group 
of formalist approaches is includes some of the more prominent neo-
compositional2 methods: Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage, 
Jackendoff’s Conceptual Semantics, Bierwisch’s Two-Level Semantics, and 
Pustejovsky’s Generative Lexicon. 
First considering Wierzbicka’s definitions of senses incorporated into 
her sense enumeration model, the most widely discussed example is 
perhaps her outline of the conceptually fuzzy category of fruit (1985:229). 
As Geeraerts (1993:240–241) points out, almost every step in the proposed 
definitional process fails the test of generality – for example the NSM-
proposed necessary and sufficient condition of ‘they have skin harder 
than the parts inside’ for something being ‘fruit’ is easily toppled by the 
example of a strawberry (which has skin as soft as the insides) or ‘they 
have a lot of juice’ by the example of a banana (which does not). Clearly 
meanings cannot be stored in our lexicon in such a manner as handling 
the insufficiencies of the conditions that are supposed to drive them 
would be impractical in language use and in language description.
Jackendoff’s neostructuralist approach to the sense enumeration lexicon 
modeling of polysemy has also been rejected as fully encompassing on 
similar grounds as Wierzbicka’s. Perceptual 3D information that struc-
tures the window of the given conceptual structure within conceptual 
semantic reasoning fail to account for all of the extralinguistic information 
contained within that conceptual window and clearly used in production 
2  The term ‘neostructuralist’ was coined by Geeraerts (2010) and adopted here 
because it quite well describes the approaches encompassed by it – they are structuralist 
in a traditional sense but also bring novel aspects to their theoretical considerations. 
All other names of theoretical approaches are also broadly based on Geeraerts (2010).
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and disambiguation of meaning. For instance, Geeraerts (2010:140) gives 
the example of Jackendoff’s (1990:33–34) definition of go:
[Example 6] Jackendoff ’s (1990) definition of go.
[event]→[event go ([thing], [path])]
[event]→[event stay ([thing], [place])]
[event]→[event cause ([thing], [event])]  
The argument is that for verbs such as run and jog, apart from the given 
conceptual features which are also shared with, for instance, go, trot, 
walk or plod, one also has to use 3D perceptual knowledge to disam-
biguate, recreating from experience the speed and the manner of the 
movement, for example. Since their conceptual representations are the 
same (or similar enough) only perceptual knowledge can account for the 
fuzziness of go and other movement verbs listed here. However, the 
objection is that a lot of the information contained within jog, for in-
stance, cannot be deduced from just additional perceptual information 
alone: the image of a jogger (within Western society at least) is usually 
of someone belonging to the middle or upper class, jogging involves 
something done in leisure time for physical fitness, it also usually brings 
to mind certain clothes and equipment, certain place  where it is usu-
ally done (a park perhaps), and similar information (Geeraerts 2010:140). 
None of these information are accessible from the conceptual and per-
ceptual windows defined thus by Conceptual Semantics. This decompo-
sitional approach also fails to satisfy the issues of generality, since a con-
ceptual feature such as +LONG NECK referring to a duck, for instance, 
cannot be seen as primitive and general enough since it might exclude 
certain unrepresentative members of a category, such as a duck with a 
short neck perhaps (Geeraerts 2010:141). 
The Zwei-Ebenen Semantik (Bierwisch 1987) is a modular neostructural-
ist theory which observes that the linguistic system in itself is composed 
of distinct autonomous modules – morphology, phonology, syntax, se-
mantics, and the lexicon. It also models polysemy within its own version 
of the sense enumeration approach, imagining the lexicon as including 
and determining a given lexical item by its phonological, morphosyn-
tactic, and semantic features (Pethö 1999:19–21). According to this the-
ory polysemy is basically seen as underspecification on both semantic 
and conceptual levels resulting in the disambiguation process which 
starts with a logical form which is extracted from the semantic informa-
tion of the constituent lexical items (Pethö 1999:22). The logical form is 
then connected to the conceptual level of representation which tries to 
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interpret the meanings by looking at a semi-determined family of con-
cepts, being aided in that process by the extralinguistic context. This 
process of conceptual specification however fails to provide clear criteria 
of how appropriate readings are chosen both from the lexicon and from 
the conceptual system by the context. 
One more notable sense enumeration neostructuralist methodology 
which actually stems from a close connection to computational linguis-
tics is James Pustejovsky’s (1998) Generative Lexicon which tries to mod-
ify the stored meanings conception of polysemy.  The modification is to 
be found in a rich semantic structure constructed for each lexical entry. 
Out of several such rich semantic structures introduced within the ap-
proach semantically most relevant and unusual (due to the type of extra-
linguistic information propose as being part of the lexicon) is the qualia 
structure and the roles within it:
–  the constitutive role provides information on what the denotate is 
made of, including any important parts of it – a bicycle is made of 
metal, has two wheels, etc.;
–  the formal role distinguishes the denotate out of a larger domain 
– a bicycle is a vehicle, a means of transport;
–  the telic role provides the denotate’s function or purpose – a bicycle 
is used for transportation; and
–  the agentive role outlines how was the denotate constructed or came 
into existence – a bicycle was constructed, made (Pustejovsky 1998).
The major issue with this approach is that the categories within the rich 
semantic structures are rather vague and very interpretative (lacking in 
solid criteria on how to select them) – for example, a bicycle can also be 
made of plastic or gold (constitutive role), and can also be used for exer-
cise at home as well (formal role). 
Casting a glance once more the formalist (atomistic) approaches to ac-
counting for polysemy, several failures can be summarized. The first 
major drawback in the general view of polysemy which the given theo-
retical framework shows is in seeing meanings as all listed in an exclu-
sively enumerative fashion (which is one of the major prerequisites of 
formalist models). This in fact is not a practically feasible option as we 
saw – first, it puts too much strain on the mental lexicon (being that 
meaning extensions of one lexeme can be seen as contextually infinite); 
and second, it reduces polysemy to pure accidental semantic arbitrariness 
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with apparently no links between the multiple senses tied to one lexeme. 
As we saw, various attempts to deal with this problem in a decomposi-
tional manner did not manage to arrive at a full account of polysemy. 
Among the insufficiencies the combined decompositional approaches 
display is the lack of any possibility to properly define lexical concepts, 
using any kind of proposed primitive semantic (necessary and sufficient) 
building-blocks. One more problem is here the inability of definitions 
to encompass the vagueness and the typicality effects of lexical concepts, 
thus failing to achieve general definitional adequacy in total. More flex-
ible frameworks needed to emerge – those of cognitive semantics and 
lexical pragmatics (Falkum 2011).
3. C ognitive representation of polysemy
Cognitive semantics is a theoretical approach that tries to make peace 
between various extreme linguistic theories and semantic tenets (such 
as encyclopedic vs. linguistic knowledge, conceptual vs. lexical, etc.), and 
it does so in the case of polysemy as well (Dobrić 2010; Dobrić 2011). The 
approach takes what is the theoretical and practical middle ground and 
sees, in its later cutting-edge model, some senses as stored while others 
are understood as produced by the context and derived from other sens-
es (Tyler and Evans 2003)3. It makes such an assumption by proposing a 
radically different view of word meaning than the decompositional ap-
proaches and is based in essence on the attested typicality effects (Evans 
and Green 2006:342–352). Prototype theory in cognitive sciences sees 
categories of knowledge organized around a prototypical representative 
of the given category, with members closer or further away from that 
center and a fuzzy border which in fact overlaps with other categories. 
Figure 2 gives us a simplified overview of the idea.      
This model of cognition can successfully be superimposed onto lexical 
concepts. By doing so the cognitive semantic paradigm denounces the 
long standing need (stemming in essence, as we saw, from Aristotle) for 
sufficient and necessary conditions in the procedure of meaning demar-
cation and makes a clear break with attempts at formalization of mean-
ing. The early cognitive model of prototypicality in polysemy  suggested 
that meanings of a polysemous lexical item are organized around a se-
mantic prototype with meanings closer to it being more prototypical 
than the peripheral ones (Fillmore 1982) mimicking thus the proposed 
3  Though the early model actually represented a cognitive-based version of the 
sense enumeration lexicon (see for instance Lakoff (1987)).
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conceptual organization of our minds. One of the hurdles that this early 
model could not overcome was that it was unable to account for complex 
concepts  – for example, a budgerigar can be considered a prototypical 
PET BIRD, but not a prototypical BIRD (being perhaps a sparrow) nor a 
prototypical PET (a cat or a dog sufficing in this case) (Fodor 1998:174). 
Another big theoretical insufficiency was the fact that many concepts 
lack a clearly attestable prototype, such as KNOWLEDGE or BELIEF. 
Furthermore, the fact is that people understand lexical concepts and 
their polysemous extensions without having to rely on prototypicality 
information, as, for instance, we can see with the example of the various 
meanings the abstract noun knowledge may have, all of which are easily 
disambiguated by as without having a clear idea of what a prototype of 
the category KNOWLEDGE would be.
The first alteration to this prototype model came from Lakoff (1987) and 
his claim that the real application of the family resemblance effects and 
prototypicality should be sought in the existence of more comprehensive 
and more complex patterns of general knowledge found in idealized cog-
nitive models (ICMs). An ICM is a relatively well-entrenched system of 
experiences and knowledge that arises from them having to refer to a 
particular concept. There is no hierarchical gradation within the ICM 
and it is encyclopedic knowledge that highlights denotates as being more 
or less typical instances of a given category. Additional factors producing 
typicality effects are cluster concepts (Lakoff 1987:74) which are formed 
out of various different ICMs and the features that represent them, presence 
and absence of which characterizes one denotate as being closer to or 
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Figure 2. An example of overlapping categories of FURNITURE and APPLIANCES 
with the prototypes in the centers and fuzzy members at peripheries.
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further from the totality of all ICMs in the cluster (Figure 3). This model 
of knowledge representation actually gave rise to the more contemporary 
cognitive semantic view of polysemy, though analyzed and presented in 
a myriad of variations and improvements – that of a radial category 
(Brugman 1988; Brugman and Lakoff 1988).
Figure 3. A simplified example of an ICM cluster of the concept FURNITURE. 
Radial categories involve a central cluster concept which is combined 
with a number of extensions all representing certain variants of the giv-
en central ICM cluster. In this way lexical concepts could be seen as 
truly mirroring the conceptual organization of the mind and all word 
meanings are then to be understood as organized according to a proto-
typical central sense. Consider the following examples of the verb look 
as an illustration of radial categories in lexical meaning:
[Example 7] Filip looked at the page.
[Example 8] Filip was looking for the page.
[Example 9] Filip was looking through the book.
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
- THINGS FOUND IN AN APARTMENT 
- THINGS FOUND IN AN OFFICE 
- THINGS USED TO REST IN AN APARTMENT 
- THINGS USED TO HAVE FUN IN AN APARTMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
- THINGS USED TO WORK IN AN APARTMENT 
- THINGS USED TO REST IN AN OFFICE 
+ MORE… 
FURNITURE 
- THINGS FOUND IN THE APARTMENT 
- THINGS USED TO REST IN AN APARTMENT 
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?
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[Example 10] Filip looked after his little sister.
[Example 11] Filip looked the stranger up and down.
The idea is that all of these different senses can be seen as stemming from 
one prototypical sense (Figure 4) – assuming here for the sake of the 
example the sense ‘direct your gaze towards someone or something or in 
a specified direction’ seen in [Example 7] as the central reading – and all 
exhibiting different degrees of typicality, all together creating a meaning 
chain of attribute-related senses (Lakoff and Brugman 1988). Less pro-
totypical senses are derived from more prototypical ones through various 
mechanisms of meaning extensions (such as metaphorization and 
metonymization), leaving some marginally connected senses to have 
quite different and at first glance entirely unrelated meanings – for in-
stance, the sense ‘evaluate someone carefully’ seen in [Example 11] can 
be interpreted as a conceptual metaphor OBSERVING IS JUDGING em-
bodying an extension of the physical act of observing realized in the 
assumed prototypical instance in [Example 7]. The problem with the 
methodology at this stage was still assumed that all of the meanings are 
stored in the mental lexicon. This has been criticized as unfeasible be-
cause it would entail an endless mental storage capacity of different 
senses in order to cover the full range of possible lexical concepts, which 
could be assumed as virtually unlimited through novel meanings.
Another big problem of the model presented like this lies in the absence 
of any criteria that can be used to discern one meaning from another, 
apart from subjective intuition. Having in mind all the given inconsisten-
cies, there were several lines of improvements of the original ICM-based 
sense-enumeration radial model put in place. 
The first thing to be modified in the ICM and radial category approach 
was to soften its perspective on the extent of senses understood as stored 
in the mental lexicon. Such a softened approach, as seen for example in 
the principled polysemy model (Tyler and Evans 2001), involves seeing 
two types of senses in order to avoid problems of the polysemy fallacy: 
as previously stated, there are the senses entrenched and stored in the 
lexicon and there are the ones pragmatically derived by context. The main 
perspective of the cognitive framework is particularly important because 
of its mediatory view on the representational issue in polysemy – some 
are readings of a lexeme which are allowed to be seen as more central and 
are stored in the mental lexicon, while some are attestably less salient 
(including here idiomatic senses) and permitted to be only contextual 
extensions of the more entrenched senses.
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Figure 4. A simplified example of a radial category of the verb look (the links between 
the senses are arbitrary and are given here just for exemplification purposes).
4. Lexical-pragmatic representation of polysemy
We have seen formalist approaches to polysemy, imagining lexical mean-
ings as all stored and enumerated in the mental lexicon and the cognitive 
approaches seeing them in a mediatory manner as partly derived from 
 
 
 
for a structure or a room to have a view 
or outlook in a specified direction 
ignore someone or something by 
pretending not to notice them 
observe an event without being involved 
think or regard in a particular manner 
expect (hope) to do something 
observe someone without displaying 
embarrassment or fear  
ignore wrongdoing  
make future plans 
express a perceived air of superiority 
reminisce past events 
view someone with superiority  
eagerly await something or someone  
pay a short visit 
quickly take notice 
suffer a setback  
bring an improvement to a situation 
rely on someone or something  
have respect for someone express or show something to someone 
take care of someone or something 
examine and consider 
inspect something briefly 
peruse a book or other written material 
move round in order to investigate 
something 
investigate in great detail 
evaluate someone or something with a 
quick glance 
evaluate someone carefully 
direct your gaze 
towards someone or  
 
 
 
 
something or in a 
specified direction 
look (v) 
attempt to find 
pay a social visit while going somewhere else  search for and find  particular  information in a piece of writing  
have the appearance of show likelihood of appear your usual self 
have the appearance of being as old as you are 
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one core meaning and partly stored. The other end of the extreme, a 
complete opposite of the sense enumeration lexicon, is to see all mean-
ings as just a problem of reference and clearly deducible from the prag-
matic context alone (Nunberg 1979; 1996). The highlighting of senses 
works both through linguistic deixis, but also through a process of de-
ferred reference, which entails referring indirectly to another entity in 
close relationship with the intended referent which is then successfully 
identified by employing common knowledge, following from the notion 
of cooperative principles of communication (Pethö 1999:24). Other 
pragmatically-based theories build on such a representational image. 
One improvement was achieved by adding the theory of conversational 
implicatures (Blutner 1998) to the original pragmatic-based conception. 
Another addition, stemming from Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1995), can be seen in accounting for polysemy and contextual influence 
by referring to the underspecification of intended concepts in the pro-
duced lexical concept which needs to be resolved through pragmatic in-
ference processing (Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Simplified process of pragmatic inference according to Sperber and Wilson (1995).
Following from the experience of cognitive and structuralist paradigms, 
any extreme model (be it entirely enumerative or entirely core meaning) 
ultimately proves unattainable. Hence, the later lexical-pragmatic mod-
el does in fact acknowledge some senses as stored – those belonging to 
conventional polysemy, which it sees as etymologically evident. This 
softened pragmatic approach is then in itself very close to the less radical 
 
Marina needs a chair to go to the beach. 
ICM  
for  
CHAIR 
underspecified 
lexical concept 
PRAGMATIC 
CONTEXT 
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cognitive approaches and can perhaps successfully lead is towards a 
meaningful potential model. 
5. Discussion – how to observe polysemy
As can be deduced from the problems raised by the various theoretical 
takes on polysemy, it is indeed a very complex semantic issue. However, 
but perhaps the models and their elaborations could be distilled into a 
most probable (or the most supported) account. 
Looking at the more traditional formalist approaches (namely structuralist, 
generativist and neostructuralist paradigms) the conclusion is that they 
cannot sufficiently explain, through their componential methodology, the 
various vagaries of lexical meaning. They fail at the definitional level, not 
being able to provide fully encompassing definitions of senses within a 
polysemous item; they also, for the most part, fail to account for typicality 
effects; they fail at the criteria level, the criteria not being clearly presented 
in the definitional practice these approaches stand for; and ultimately they 
by default fail in their sense enumeration approach to polysemy as well. A 
more appropriate account of polysemy, as well as of meaning itself, is then 
perhaps to be found in the cognitive semantic theory and lexical pragmat-
ics. A mediatory approach which will allow for some senses of a lexeme to 
be recognized as more ‘important’ than others (and stored), but which will 
also acknowledge the evident semantic links between the multiple senses 
and allow for these senses to be extendable from the more core meaning(s) 
seems to be suggesting itself. If we take it as the most plausible model, we 
can examine and specify it further through its several more focused and 
more discretely described individual instantiations. 
One such variation, bordering on radical pragmatics, can be found in 
Geeraerts’ (1993:288–262) conclusion on the inconsistencies of polysemy 
tests. He notes4 that the distinction between polysemy and vagueness 
cannot be clearly maintained due to contextual flexibility. Linking his 
reasoning to the lexical pragmatic model, Geeraerts (1993) proposes that 
meaning should rather be seen as a process – the process of meaning 
construction through context5. The family resemblance effects within an 
4  Following Bosch’s (1979) reasoning which suggests reinforcing the distinction be-
tween vagueness and ambiguity by first identifying a bridging context bringing to-
gether given meanings.
5  This kind of approach challenges then the very possibility of objective lexical 
semantics since there seems to be no space left for objective meanings but rather 
only for contextual interpretations.
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existence of a core prototype are preserved within this account though 
(evoking the Vantage Point theory of semantics proposed by MacLaury 
(1991)), where the context highlights the meaning necessary for the given 
domain rather than having it fixed in advance (Geeraerts, 1993:260). 
A similar version of the mediatory approach to polysemy, only outlined in 
more detail, can be seen in Tuggy (1993). The idea, stemming in essence 
from Langacker (1987), is that cognitive schemas, as elaborated in concepts, 
exist in the mental lexicon to the extent to which they become entrenched 
through repeated usage. The better entrenched they are the more salient 
they become, occurring more forcefully and being activated more easily 
by the context (Tuggy 1993) – these are the stored meanings. If a schema 
exists, but is not salient enough, the lexical item is then polysemous, exist-
ing between full ambiguity (homonymy) and vagueness – the derivable 
meanings. The influence of context in meaning selection comes as a given 
within this cognitive model, as it is one of the major factors enhancing 
entrenchment, frequency of occurrence in the discourse determining the 
strength of subsequent contextual activation (Tuggy 1993:285–286). 
One more relevant cognitive semantic interpretation is seen in Dunbar’s 
(2001) critique of Geeraerts’ (1993) and Tuggy’s (1993) elaborations on 
the nature of polysemy and meaning. The assertion is that a clear distinc-
tion between ambiguity and vagueness can be clearly marked and spec-
ified within a cognitive model. Lexical concepts are seen as using ency-
clopedic knowledge in the creation of conceptual representation outlined 
by the given discourse situation (Dunbar 2001:11). Parameters within 
lexical concepts are sometimes specified by the concepts and sometimes 
vague, the choice of reading coming from background knowledge. Some 
of these concepts are stored separately by learning, accounting for the 
attested individually different numbers and types of concepts elicited 
from different people (Langacker 1987) and the different subjective levels 
of awareness of the relatedness between concepts. Since this conceptual 
history of acquisition and origins of concepts is not available consciously, 
people only engage in metacognitive reflection on meaning with the con-
text as a knowledge background (Dunbar 2001:12). 
Deane’s (1987; 1988) approach departs from the cognitive model towards 
a more pragmatically-orientated theory, but still retains some aspects of 
the cognitive semantic view on polysemy. The starting point for this the-
ory is also extralinguistic knowledge and it also sees, such as Dunbar (2001), 
a clear division between homonymy, polysemy, and vagueness. The point 
of departure is that the approach does not recognize any prototype model 
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within polysemy, which it sees as confusion between various aspects of 
meaning abstraction and a lack of certain semantic features stemming 
from encyclopedic knowledge (Deane 1987). Another later addition to 
this referential theory is the emphasis on the influence of context, stem-
ming from Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995) and notions of 
pragmatic attention (Deane 1987:148). 
All of the outlined cognitively and pragmatically motivated models, they 
are (for the most part) centered around the view that a variety of meanings 
seen in polysemy are products of the context and disambiguated by look-
ing at pragmatic reference (Dobrić 2013). They all, however, soften the 
contextual conditioning by the assertion that at core of the contextual 
extensions of meaning connected to one lexeme is a central prototypical 
meaning permeating in some (more or less opaque) manner through the 
entire polysemy spectrum of the lexeme. Polysemy and its place in ac-
counting for meaning is then perhaps truly to be observed in a mediatory 
manner: some meanings are definitely more entrenched in our mental 
lexicon – they are acquired by children before any other members within 
a given semantic category; they are usually the ones that first come to mind 
and are produced first in psychological priming experiments; they are the 
earliest attested senses in etymological terms; they are also easiest to rec-
ognize and are hence perceptually most salient; and, since prototypes are 
products of earliest acquisition, they are also easiest to memorize (and 
hence fastest and easiest to elicit). These prototypical meanings are then 
surely stored and permanently and strongly linked to a given lexeme in our 
mental lexicons. Other meanings are less salient, some of them coming 
into being and disappearing regularly over time, some (an infinite number 
of them in fact) exiting in potentia, and all only retrievable through sub-
stantial contextual referencing. These are to be seen as not stored and 
only derivable (more or less concretely) from the mentioned more salient 
(prototypical) senses, though they do have an intrinsic possibility to, over 
time and sufficient use in the discourse, become efficiently entrenched 
and take their place as one of the stored ones.
Primljeno: 15. 7. 2014.
Prihvaćeno: 22. 10. 2014.
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Nikola Dobrić
O nekim problemima značenja – polisemija između paradigme 
nabrajanja značenja i paradigme centralnog značenja
Apstrakt
Polisemija je semantički fenomen višeznačnosti gde su višestruka značenja 
jedne lekseme međusobno povezana. Razlikuje se od homonimije, drugog 
kraja semantičkog ambiguiteta, po tome što su u tom slučaju višestruka zna-
čenja jedne iste lekseme nepovezana i jedino produkt etimološke slučajnosti. 
Iako se polisemija može smatrati komunikacijski  nevažnim fenomenom jer 
se rešenja za disambiguaciju leksema nalaze uvek lako dostupna u diskursu 
i kontekstu, sistematsko objašnjenje funkcionisanja višeznačnosti bazirano 
na jasnim kriterijumima nije jednostavno i još uvek predstavlja relativno 
otvoreno pitanje leksičke semantike. Rad prvo predstavlja pregled raznih 
teorijskih modela polisemije sa posebnim osvrtom na kognitivne aspekte 
višeznačnosti. Fokus rada je da predloži najutemeljeniji teorijski pogled na 
polisemiju koji se može zasnovati na postojećim filozofskim, semantičkim, 
i kognitivnim teorijama višeznačnosti.
Ključne reči: polisemija, ambiguitet, kognicija, filozofija jezika, semanitka, 
prototipikalnost, kognitivna semantika, neostrukturalizam, generativna 
semantika, leksička pragmatika
